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Abstract
Transparent decision-making processes are widely regarded as a prerequi-
site for the working of a representative democracy. It facilitates accountability,
and citizens may suspect that decisions, if taken behind closed doors, do not
promote their interests. Why else the secrecy? We provide a model of com-
mittee decision-making that explains the publics demand for transparency,
and committee members aversion to it. In line with case study evidence,
we show how pressures to become transparent induce committee members to
organize pre-meetings away from the public eye. Outcomes of pre-meetings
are less determined, more anarchic, than those of formal meetings, but within
bounds. We characterize feasible deals that are credible and will be endorsed
in the formal meeting.
Keywords: Committee decision-making, reputational concerns, transparency,
pre-meetings, deliberation
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1 Introduction
Transparent decision-making processes are widely regarded as a prerequisite for the
working of a representative democracy. One reason is that transparency facilitates
democratic accountability. Another reason is that when representatives make de-
cisions behind closed doors, the citizens may suspect that their interests are not
fully promoted. Why else the secrecy? Against the background of the potential
advantages of transparency, it is hardly surprising that legislation, like the Freedom
of Information Act in the United States, tries to foster transparency. More gener-
ally, over thirty countries have passed Open Government codes, which establish the
principle that a citizen should be able to access any public document(Prat, 2005,
p.2). However, it is not always clear that this type of legislation succeeds in safe-
guarding transparency. Stiglitz (1998) was shocked by the focus on secrecy in the
Clinton administration when he served as the chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers. Roberts (2006) documents various ways in which governmental bodies in,
among others, the United Kingdom and Canada have adapted to demands for more
transparency, ranging from formal challenges through changes in record-keeping to
outright failure to create records.
Even when a process is formally transparent, it is not always the case that
the actual decision-making process is truly open. Illustrative in this respect is
Greenspans response to the pressure from U.S. Congress that the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) should become more transparent. He conjectured that
the request of Congress would induce an important change: [a] tendency would
arise for one-on-one pre-meeting discussions, with public meetings merely announc-
ing already agreed-upon positions or each participant to enter the meeting with a
nal position not subject to the views of others(Greenspan, as quoted in Meade
and Stasavage forthcoming, pp. 18-19). When discussing decision-making within
the European Council of Ministers, Stasavage (2005) also points to the possibility
that more transparency may lead to more backroom discussions or deals over lunch.
This paper addresses two main questions. The rst question is why decision
makers wish to deliberate in private, or why, as Stiglitz (1998, p.17) puts it, "there
remains an obsession with secrecy despite Americas social consensus in favor of
openness". The second question goes one step further. Suppose that formally a
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decision-making process is transparent, but that a decision is pre-cooked behind
closed doors. What can we say about the decision being taken?
To answer both questions we develop a model that describes a situation where
on behalf of the public a committee has to make a binary decision, deciding for
change or maintaining the status quo. Whether change or the status quo is the
proper decision from the publics perspective depends on the consequences of the
decision. At the moment the decision is made, these consequences are uncertain.
Each member has a private view of the consequences. The more likely it is that
someone is competent, the more likely it becomes that a members view provides
an accurate picture of these consequence. A member does not know whether he is
competent or not, only that he is competent with a certain probability. A crucial
feature of our model is that a committee member would like to take the decision that
is best from the publics perspective, but also cares about how the public perceives
his ability to foresee the consequences of a decision.
The decision is made in two stages. In the rst stage, the communication stage,
members discuss their views. In the second stage, the voting stage, the committee
makes a decision through voting. Initially, we assume that whether the decision
taken was the correct one from the publics perspective is not immediately apparent.
Decisions on large infrastructure projects are an example. Once the decision has
been taken, it may take years if not decades to nd out whether the construction
of tunnels, ports, and railway lines unlock an area or should be considered a waste.
Also the consequences of changes in, say, the nancing of the health care sector, the
curriculum of schools, or the composition of the Army only become known years after
the decision has been taken. As the consequences in these cases are not immediately
apparent, the public cannot assess the decision-making competence of a committee
member on the basis of the quality of his forecast.
In a truly transparent decision process, the public observes the exchange of views
thanks to, say, the presence of cameras or the publication of verbatim transcripts.
We show that members share their views and make decisions that are optimal from
a social point of view. This desirable behaviour provides an explanation for the
demand for transparency. Our analysis also hints at an explanation for why com-
mittee members are averse to transparency, and want to deliberate in private. As
the public does not learn the proper decision, it forms a perception of the mem-
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bersdecision-making abilities by comparing their statements. Disagreement signals
lack of competence, as competent members view the consequences of the project
in the same way. As a result, committee members have an incentive to organize
a pre-meeting. A pre-meeting can be used to collect all opinions, determine what
decision suits the public best, but conceal disagreement from the public by showing
a united front favouring the decision. By a pre-meeting, we mean a meeting without
cameras and of which no minutes are kept, and that can be used, therefore, to freely
exchange views. Lunches and dinners before o¢ cial meetings are examples, but also
a quick exchange in a colleagues o¢ ce before entering the o¢ cial, public, meeting.
We next assume that a secret pre-meeting is held and that the public is aware
of this. At rst glance, one may think that a transparent decision-making process
where the decision is pre-cooked in a pre-meeting is equivalent to a closed process
where the public does not observe how a decision is reached. There are two subtle
di¤erences, however. First, in a formal closed process there are rules that stipulate
how decisions are made. One important rule is the voting rule, which determines
how many votes are required for a change. Pre-meetings often do not take place
within a formal framework. No document states their terms of reference, nor the
voting rule to be used. Instead, custom, a persons rhetoric, prestige, and seniority
may play an important role during the pre-meeting. The ability of a member to
inict damage on fellow members or to obtain his goal outside the pre-meeting may
grant him power and limit the power of others. Second, deals made in pre-meetings
have to be endorsed in the formal meeting. If, for example, in the pre-meeting
members agree to form a united front and to vote for change, nobody should have
an incentive to deviate from such an agreement in the formal meeting. To put it
di¤erently, deals made in a pre-meeting have to be credible.
To analyze the e¤ect of pre-meetings on decisions we determine the range of fea-
sible deals made in a pre-meeting that will be endorsed in the formal meeting. We
briey summarize our main results. Recall that members want to conceal disagree-
ment to avoid reputational damage. It directly follows that committee members
want to speak with once voice in the formal meeting. This will be part of a deal.
Another part of the deal is the decision to be favoured in the formal meeting. An
important result is that reputational concerns give incentives to distort that decision.
To study the credibility of a deal made in the pre-meeting, we analyze committee
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members incentives to break the deal in the formal meeting. We argue that the
only motivation to break the deal is to prevent a distorted decision. Moreover,
we show that breaking a deal damages ones reputation. A direct implication is
that the member who is least concerned about his reputation has the strongest
incentives to break the deal. A member can break a deal in the formal meeting
either by voting against the pre-cooked decision in the voting stage or by breaking
the united front in the communication stage. A somewhat obvious, but important,
result is that breaking the deal must alter the nal decision. The loss in reputation
has to be compensated by the benet of a better decision. A direct implication
is that unilaterally breaking the deal in the voting stage only makes sense when
a decision for change requires unanimity. Relatedly, if a member breaks the deal
in the communication stage, a su¢ cient number of members (the exact number
depends on the voting rule) must respond to this by voting against the agreed
decision. Committee members may be willing to vote against the agreed decision,
because once a member has broken the united front in the communication stage,
the reputational benets from a distorted decision are lower. Out-of-equilibrium
beliefs play an important role in membersdecisions whether or not to support a
deviating member. In general, the more distorted is the pre-cooked decision, the
stronger is a members incentive to deviate in the formal meeting or to support a
deviating member. The formal meeting thus limits the deals that can be made in
the pre-meeting.
Is transparency to no avail? Would it be better to leave a decision-making process
closed, such that deliberation and voting in the formal meeting remain hidden from
the public eye? A formal meeting is typically characterized by a voting rule. This
adds determinacy to the outcome of the process. If imposing transparency gives
rise to a pre-meeting, the lack of a voting rule in that meeting makes its outcome
unpredictable. This we consider a drawback. Transparency, however, may be a good
thing. The public can only benet from the fact that deals that are struck in the
pre-meeting have to be endorsed in the formal, public, meeting, as it tempers the
enthusiasm for unwarranted decisions.
The next section discusses the related literature. Section 3 presents the model,
and sections 4-6 contain the analysis. A number of extensions are discussed in
section 7. In section 7.1, we examine committee membersincentives to shun the
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pre-meeting. There are two important di¤erences between skipping a pre-meeting
and deviating in the formal meeting. First, by skipping the pre-meeting, a member
does not learn the views other members hold. It will therefore be unclear whether it
is worth to skip the pre-meeting. Second, staying away from a pre-meeting forces a
member to anticipate what kind of deal the other members will make in his absence.
Skipping a pre-meeting only makes sense if it weakens the incentives of the other
members to distort the decision. We show that this is not always the case. In
section 7.2, we examine the incentives to organize a pre-meeting if the public does
observe the consequences of the decision. A statement that is conrmed by reality
boosts a members reputation, while a refuted statement hurts it. The inclination
to organize a pre-meeting is still felt. A pre-meeting allows each member to form
a better opinion and thus increases the likelihood of seeing his public statement
conrmed by the actual consequences. Finally, in section 7.3 we show that a truly
transparent process may lead to posturing if members know their own and each
otherslevels of competence. This posturing leads to a distorted decision. A pre-
meeting remains a useful tool to hide conicting views.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the rst to analyse pre-meetings. It con-
tributes to the literature on the benets and costs of transparent decision processes.
There is a long history to this debate in the political science literature on democracy,
see Stasavage (2007) for a concise overview. Transparency is needed for account-
ability and may increase the legitimacy of decisions taken. It has been recognized,
though, that transparency may give rise to posturing. A delegate, rather than tak-
ing an action that he truly believes will further the interests of the constituents, may
decide to act in accordance with what the constituents believe is the right action.
This form of posturing stems from a delegates desire to convince the constituents
that he shares their preferences or ideology. Morris (2001) analyses these incentives
in an advisor game. Stasavage (2007) studies the inclination of a delegate to use
his vote as a signal of preference alignment in a group decision process. He shows
that the incentive to do so is stronger in a transparent process than in a closed
decision-making.
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Posturing may also result from a desire to come across as an expert who is
able to ascertain the truth about something that is relevant to the constituent. In
Fingleton and Raith (2005), there is uncertainty about the ability of a delegate to
obtain information about the opponents fallback option. If a bargainer cares about
his reputation, open rather than closed negotiations may harm the constituent due
to overly aggressive bargaining. The nding that a principal does not necessarily
benet from information on the action taken by an agent who wants to maintain a
reputation for competence is also presented in Prat (2005). Levy (2007) analyses
behaviour of experts in a voting game. Experts receive possibly correlated informa-
tion about the state of the world. She nds that if correlation is weak or absent, a
closed process induces members to favour the conventional decision, i.e., the decision
that is a priori more likely or the one that requires the least unequivocal support.
This decision acts as a safe haven as it obscures how members actually voted. This
conformism bias disappears if correlation is strong. In this case, there is a bias to
support the unconventional decision. The conformism bias also disappears in case
of a transparent process.
Other implications of transparent processes have also been studied. Perry and
Samuelson (1994) assume that open-door negotiations allow constituents to inter-
vene if they are apprehensive about the way the negotiations are evolving. Such
is not possible in case of closed-door negotiations, and this may well be benecial.
Gersbach and Hahn (2004) show that transparency improves selection and increases
alignment of interests between delegates and constituents over time.1 Patacconi
(2007) argues that the requirement to publish information that is used in politi-
cal decision-making gives rise to information manipulation by politicians who care
about re-election.
The issues of transparency in general and transparent decision processes in par-
ticular have been debated extensively in the realm of central banking.2 Two contri-
butions are especially relevant for the present paper. Meade and Stasavage (forth-
coming) and Swank, Swank and Visser (2007), using data gathered by Meade (2005),
discuss the changes in the nature of the deliberations at the FOMC that resulted
1Matozzi and Merlo (2007) stress that selection may give rise to sorting of individuals between
politics and private business.
2Geraats (2002) provides a taxonomy of dimensions in which a central bank can be transparent.
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from the pressure of U.S. Congress on the FOMC to publish verbatim transcripts
with a ve-year time lag. Meade and Stasavage argue that this pressure has strength-
ened the incentives to herd in a sequential decision-making process. Swank, Swank
and Visser stress that it has shifted the locus of the real debate, away from the
formal FOMC meeting to pre-meetings.
This paper also contributes to the literature on committee decision-making. That
literature has focused on the question whether a group makes better decisions than
a single individual. This question has often been analysed using the jury metaphor
in which jurors have to decide on the verdict of the accused. Jurors care (possibly
to varying degrees) about type I and type II errors. Li, Rosen and Suen (2001) show
that conicts of interest provide a rationale for voting rules. The quality of commit-
tee decisions depends on the specic voting rule used (Feddersen and Pesendorfer
1998, Ladha 1992, Young 1988) and on the number of jurors (Mukhopadhaya 2003
and Persico 2004). The situation we describe is not analogous to a jury problem. We
view decision-makers as experts who also care about their perceived decision-making
ability. This is plausible when members are selected because of their expertise, some-
thing that does not apply to jurors. Unlike most studies on jury decision making,
we describe situations in which members deliberate before casting a vote. Coughlan
(2000) is one of the rst to show how the possibility of even minimal communication
changes the role of voting rules.3 Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2002) and Visser
and Swank (2007) argue that the choice of voting rule should balance the quality
of deliberation and the alignment of interests of the decisive voter with those of
the public.4 Dessein (2007) and Wernerfelt (2007) consider the way in which the
committee structure a¤ects the intensity and quality of deliberation. Ottaviani and
Sørensen (2001) study the inuence of herding on the quality of debate, and the de-
sired order of speech. Caillaud and Tirole (2007) analyse how a sponsor of a project
can persuade a group by deciding who to approach rst, who next.
Recently, economists have analysed group polarization and groupthink. In the
psychological literature, these phenomena are often presented as instances of process
lossfrom which groups may su¤er.5 Eliaz, Ray and Razin (2006) and Sobel (2006)
3See also Geradi andYariv (2006).
4Meirowitz (2004, 2005) compares the e¤ectiveness of debate and transfers in inducing infor-
mation revelation.
5See, e.g., Aronson, Wilson and Akert (2005).
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discuss group polarization, the observation that individuals as a group may advise
or take a decision that is more extreme than any member would advise or take
individually. Especially Sobel insists that polarization may be an outcome that
is not only rational but even rst-best. Groupthink, rather than referring to the
outcome of a group process like polarization, is a hypothesis about behaviour taking
place while deliberating. It would be a source of awed decisions. Coined by Janis
(1972), it refers to a tendency to seek concurrence in the group with the aim of
maintaining the approval of fellow members. It would lead to, among others, the
presentation of manipulated information that favours a particular decision, a lack
of discussion about that information in the presence of doubts about its validity,
and a united front to the outside world in support of the nal decision. In Visser
and Swank (2007), we view these phenomena not as a result of groupthink but as
the outcome of deliberation and voting by a group of members who care both about
project value and about their perceived decision-making ability.6
3 The Model
On behalf of the public, a committee of n persons, i 2 I = f1; :::; ng has to decide
between maintaining the status quo, X = 0, and implementing a project, X =
1. By normalization, status quo delivers a payo¤ equal to zero. If the project is
implemented, the project payo¤ to each member (and the public) equals p+. The
parameter p is the ex ante expected payo¤ from X = 1. The stochastic term 
captures that the state of the environment, and therefore the payo¤ from X = 1,
is uncertain. We assume that  2 f h; hg, with equal prior probability. Moreover,
we assume that (i) p < 0, implying that the committee has a bias against project
implementation; (ii) p+ h > 0, implying that the socially optimal decision depends
on the state of the economy.
At the beginning of the game, each member i 2 I possesses a private signal about
, si 2

sb; sg
	
. A signal refers to a members assessment, forecast or view of  (b is
bad and g is good). Whether this signal is informative depends on a members type,
ti. Each member can be smart or dumb, ti 2 fsm; dug. The prior probability that a
6Our explanation is therefore more in line with Kramers account of the decision processes that
Janis analyses (1998).
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member is smart equals . A smart member has a fully informative signal about .
His view on  is awless, Pr ( = h j sg; sm) = Pr   =  h j sb; sm = 1. A dumb
member receives an uninformative signal: Pr ( = h j sg; du) = Pr   = h j sb; du =
1=2. He does not learn anything new about the expected value of the project. A
member does not know his own competence, only the probability with which he is
smart, .7 ;8 The ex ante probabilities of  and the prior probability  are common
knowledge.
Preferences of committee members over the alternatives consist of two parts, one
reecting the public interest, and one reecting reputational concerns. Specically,
member is preferences are represented by:
Ui (X = 1) = p+ + i^i (
1) (1)
Ui (X = 0) = i^i (
0) ; (2)
where ^i denotes the posterior belief held by the marketor the publicthat com-
mittee member i is smart. We refer to this belief as member is reputation. This
reputation is based on observed and inferred information, 
X . The fact that the
information set is indexed by the decision on the project, implies that the public
observes at least this decision. It does not observe the state of the environment
.9 Depending on the way the decision-process is organized the market may also
observe how the project decision is arrived at. The parameter i measures how
much committee member i cares about his reputation. Committee members have
homogenous preferences as to the project, but di¤er in the weight they attribute to
their reputation, 1 < 2 < ::: < n. These weights are common knowledge. We
use (1) and (2) with i = 0 to represent the publics interest.
The decision on the project is made in two stages. In the rst stage, the com-
munication stage, each member sends a message, mi 2

mb;mg
	
. By this we mean
that a member presents an analysis of . In the second stage, the voting stage,
the messages sent are common knowledge, and the members vote on the project,
vi 2

vb; vg
	
, where vi = vb (vi = vg) denotes that i votes against (in favour of)
7"Dumb" may mean "less smart". What matters for the results is that a smart type has a
higher likelihood of correctly assessing the state of the economy than a dumb type.
8In section 7.3, we study the situation in which members know their abilities.
9In section 7.2, we discuss the situation in which  is observed.
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X = 1. We assume that messages are sent simultaneously, and that votes are cast
simultaneously.10 We assume a voting rule, f , stipulating that X = 1 requires that
the number of favourable votes is at least f .
From the publics perspective, it is best if members share their private informa-
tion in the communication stage, mi = si for all i 2 I, and next decide to implement
the project if the number of positive signals, denoted by k, is su¢ ciently large. Let
E ( j k) denote the expected value of  conditional on k (out of n) positive signals.
Furthermore, let k
FB
be the threshold value such that p+E ( j k) > 0 for k  kFB
and p+ E ( j k) < 0 for k < kFB.
Denition 1. The rst-best decision rule consists of two parts. First, information
is shared, mi = si for all i 2 I. Second, the project is implemented if and only if
k  kFB.
To ensure that the committee operates in an interesting environment, we assume
that p + E ( j n) > 0 holds, as otherwise implementation would never be in the
publics interest. The determination of k
FB
is a statistical matter. As p < 0, the
optimal decision rule is characterized by k
FB  (n+ 1) =2. The stronger is the bias
against project implementation, the higher is k
FB
.
4 Transparency
We start by analysing a transparent decision-making process. In such a process,
the public observes how a decision is arrived at: it observes mi and vi of each
member. We rst show that such a process guarantees the implementation of the
rst-best decision rule and full accountability. The publics demand for transparency
is therefore understandable. We then argue that because of transparency, committee
members feel exposed as their reputation may get hurt. As a consequence, members
would like to circumvent transparency.
To see that transparency guarantees accountability it su¢ ces to show that mem-
bers share their information in the meeting. In the absence of information on , an
assessment of a members ability can best be based on the degree of concurrence of
10Amotivation for the assumption that messages are sent simultaneously is that members prepare
their analyses or statements before the meeting.
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individual statements. After all, if members share their information in the meeting,
then the messages presented by smart members coincide, and conicting statements
are a clear indication that at least one member is dumb. The larger is the number
of messages that corresponds with member is message, the stronger is member is
reputation. As a result, if other members share their private information, then a
member maximizes his expected reputation by also sharing his private information.
This maximizes the likelihood that his statement equals those of a majority of fellow
members.
Once members have shared information, a members reputation is xed. It is
then in every members interest to stick to the second part of the rst-best decision
rule, and to implement the project only if the number of positive messages exceeds
k
FB
. As all agree and vote in the same way, the voting rule is immaterial.
Proposition 1 Suppose committee decision-making is transparent. Then, in equi-
librium the committee implements the rst-best decision rule. The voting rule is
immaterial.
Proposition 1 suggests that transparency is in the publics interest. It serves
the twin goals of guaranteeing accountability and quality decisions. However, a
caveat is in order. As the public bases its assessment of a members ability on the
degree of concurrence, each members reputation is hurt by the absence of a united
front. The anticipation of possible reputational damage may induce a member to
nd out what other members intend to say. In fact, members seem to have a mutual
interest in sharing information away from the publics eye, in a pre-meeting before
the formal, transparentmeeting. Given that reputation depends on the degree of
concurrence among members, every member would benet from secretly meeting
before the formal meeting, determine what decision on the project is rst-best, and
then show a united front supporting that decision in the formal meeting.
5 Pre-meeting Deals
A pre-meeting results in a deal concerning how to act and what to decidein the
formal meeting. We remain agnostic about the way in which members come to such
a deal. We do not assign bargaining weightsto each member, nor do we specify
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the procedures used to reach the deal. Part of the deal is for all members to support
wholeheartedly the decision, both verbally and in voting, in the formal meeting.
This united front is a major obstacle to accountability, but the goal of quality
decision-making is not necessarily lost. We dene a Distortion-Free Pre-Meeting as
follows.
Denition 1 In a Distortion-Free Pre-Meeting (DFPM) with  unobserved, each
member i 2 I shares his signal si in the pre-meeting, and reports mi and votes vi in
the formal meeting using the following strategy:8<: mi = mg and vi = vg, if jsgj  kFBmi = mb and vi = vb, if jsgj < kFB: (3)
A DFPM is a face-saving device in which members share information in private,
but the decision reached is no di¤erent from what is best for the public. Members
want to speak with one voice: disagreement signals lack of ability as competent
members view the consequences of the project in the same way. That is, members
collectively wish to make the same statement in public. Anybody deviating would
hurt the reputation of everybody. Let mxI denote that all members i 2 I report
mx, x 2 fg; bg, and similarly for vxI . Thus, in case of a DFPM, the public observes
either (mgI ; v
g
I ) or
 
mbI ; v
b
I

. On the basis of the DFPM strategy, the public reaches
a conclusion about a members reputation, b mgI ; vgI ; kFB and b mbI ; vbI ; kFB.
Of course, the public sees through the memberswish to be considered competent.
It therefore realises that mgI does not mean that all members held positive views,
but merely that this number was large enough to warrant project implementation,
k  kFB. Because kFB  (n+ 1) =2, favouring project implementation commands
a higher reputation than favouring the status quo as the average degree of signal
concurrence is higher in the former than in the latter case. To see this, suppose
k
FB
= n. In case of a DFPM, the public observesmgI only if the degree of concurrence
is maximal. This boosts each members reputation. Collectively favouring the status
quo may mean all agreed the outlook was negative, k = 0 again, the maximum
degree of concurrence. However, it may also mean that members held di¤ering
opinions to varying degrees, 0 < k < n, a sign that some, or all, are incompetent.
This dilutes the reputation of a member.
13
When would a member i wish to deviate from a DFPM? As a DFPM guarantees
the highest expected project payo¤, deviating from the DFPM must be with a
view to commanding a better reputation at the inevitable cost of project payo¤.
With b mgI ; vgI ; kFB > b mbI ; vbI ; kFB, the temptation to deviate is felt most
strongly if the number of positive private views falls just short of warranting project
implementation, k = k
FB   1. In this case, the costs from deviating in terms of
expected project loss are the smallest, p + E
h
jkFB   1
i
. The gains in terms of
reputation for member i are i
b mgI ; vgI ; kFB  b mbI ; vbI ; kFB. So, for
i   :=  
p+ E
h
jkFB   1
i
b mgI ; vgI ; kFB  b mbI ; vbI ; kFB , (4)
member i does not want to deviate from the DFPM. Hence, if n  , no member
wants to deviate from a DFPM. As soon as n > , there is room for conict about
the decision to be supported in the formal meeting.
As said, we do not intend to describe the process in the pre-meeting. Rather,
we limit ourselves to describing equilibrium deals. An equilibrium deal satises two
conditions. It satises the feasibility condition. The pre-meeting as a whole cannot
be more inclined to favour the decision to implement than its most ardent defender,
nor can it be less inclined to support that decision than its most hesitant member.
It should also satisfy the endorsement condition: the deal should be endorsed in the
formal meeting. Any room the latter meeting o¤ers to deviate from the deal struck
in the pre-meeting may be exploited by a member or group of members who feels
cajoled into that deal.
We start the analysis by limiting attention to situations in which all n members
want to participate in the pre-meeting. The anticipation of an unwelcome decision
may lead a member to shun the pre-meeting, and to show up at the formal meeting
only. In section 7.1, we discuss the e¢ cacy of skipping the pre-meeting and the
associated costs.
Any deal is characterized by a pair
 
k; 

, where k is a threshold value and  a
probability. If the number of positive signals k exceeds k, the deal is to show a united
front in favour of implementation in the formal meeting, both in the message stage
and in the voting stage. If k = k, then implementation is favoured with probability
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 2 (0; 1], whereas if k falls short of k, the deal is to favour the status quo.
To determine the set DF of feasible deals, we establish its bounds. The concept
of a dictator proves useful. Member j is said to be a dictator if he can set the
terms of the deal to maximize his own utility, unencumbered by the conditions of
participation and endorsement.
Proposition 2 Suppose that j is a dictator. His optimal deal
 
kj; j

is as charac-
terized as follows.
(i) If he cares little about his reputation, j  , the optimal deal is characterized
by

k
FB
; 0

.
(ii) If j > , then one of the following holds.
(iia) [pure strategy optimal deal] Member j dictates all members to favour im-
plementation if k  kj, and to favour the status quo for k < kj, where kj satises
p+ E

jkj

+ jb  mgI ; vgI ; kj > jb  mbI ; vbI ; kj (5)
p+ E

jkj   1

+ jb  mgI ; vgI ; kj < jb  mbI ; vbI ; kj . (6)
(iib) [mixed strategy optimal deal] Member j dictates all members to favour
implementation if k > kj with probability one, to favour implementation if k = kj
with probability j, and to favour the status quo for k < kj, where
 
kj; j

satises
p+ E

jkj

+ jb  mgI ; vgI ; kj; j = jb  mbI ; vbI ; kj; j . (7)
To understand why there are two types of optimal deals in case of j > ,
note that (6) says that for given posterior beliefs b  mgI ; vgI ; kj and b  mbI ; vbI ; kj
consistent with kj, member j does not want to dictate project implementation in
case the number of positive assessments equals kj   1. He therefore does not mix in
case of k = kj   1. In case (iib), the situation is di¤erent. Now for given beliefs
that are consistent with implementation with probability one for k  kj, member j
would like to implement for k = kj   1. But if the posterior beliefs were based on
the committee implementing with probability one for k  kj   1, then he would like
to refrain from implementing if k = kj   1. As a result, there is a probability j
with which the project is implemented in case of k = kj, with
 
kj; j

characterized
by (7).
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Strong reputational concerns, j > , lead member j to prefer deviations from
the DFPM. The stronger these concerns are, the larger the deviation becomes. There
is a limit, though, to the extent to which member j prefers deviating from the DFPM.
The deviation is driven by the value attached to the reputational gap, the di¤erence
in reputation commanded in case of favouring implementation on the one hand and
supporting the status quo on the other. This can most easily be seen by rewriting
(7):
j
b  mgI ; vgI ; kj; j  b  mbI ; vbI ; kj; j| {z }

reputational gap
=    p+ E jkj .
Recall that with k
FB
> (n+ 1) =2, the reputational gap exists because the average
degree of signal concurrence in case of implementation is higher than in case of
maintaining the status quo. In equilibrium, the higher is the value of j, the larger
is the deviation from the DFPM, the lower is the average degree of signal concurrence
in case of implementation, and the larger it is in case of maintaining the status quo.
As a result, the equilibrium reputational gap becomes smaller with an increase in
j. It would disappear if member j were to dictate implementation as often as the
status quo. Given that in equilibrium the reputational gap is needed to compensate
for the loss in project value, member j stops well short of a situation in which the
gap would vanish.
Proposition 2 species the pairs
 
kn; n

and
 
k1; 1

that set the bounds for
the set of feasible deals DF .11 Of course, kn  k1. We do not impose that a
feasible deal is the optimal deal of some member j. Any feasible deal will satisfy two
conditions. First, implementation commands a higher reputation than maintaining
the status quo. Second, if there is a distortion, it is in the direction of unwarranted
implementation. In what follows, we limit analysis to deals in DF . Given a feasible
deal, what conditions should hold for the deal to be endorsed in the formal meeting?
5.1 Endorsement
We say that a deal is endorsed in the formal meeting if no individual member or
coalition of members has an incentive to deviate in the formal meeting, for any
number of favourable signals k. Two members are potentially most inclined to
11Formally,DF =
 
k; 
 jk 2 kn; : : : ; k1	 ;  2 [0; 1]	 n kn;  j > n	 [  k1;  j < 1		.
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obstruct a deal, member n who values his reputation more than anybody else, and
member 1 who cares the least about his reputation. Member n is most likely to be
dissatised with a deal to maintain the status quo, as he is most attracted by the
higher reputation commanded by project implementation. Member 1 might want
to oppose a deal to favour implementation if the higher reputation this decision
commands does not outweigh the loss in project payo¤. If neither member 1 nor
n wants to oppose a deal, then all members endorse it. A member considering
obstructing the deal asks himself two questions: will I be successful, and how much
does obstruction cost me? Stopping a pre-cooked decision requires breaking the
united front. This inevitably implies a loss of reputation. Clearly, then, a deal
favouring the status quo will never be opposed as the gains hoped for cannot be
realized. Member 1, however, might be willing to accept the low reputation that
comes with a broken front. A necessary condition is that his deviation guarantees
that the deal to implement is turned into support for the status quo in the formal
meeting.
One part of an equilibrium deal is the formation of a united front. As a result,
in equilibrium the public observes either (mgI ; v
g
I ) or
 
mbI ; v
b
I

. Deviations from equi-
librium deals give rise to out-of-equilibrium beliefs as to the membersreputations.
To study deviations from equilibria, we have to make assumptions on those beliefs.
Throughout, out-of-equilibrium beliefs are based on two premises.
Premise 1. A deviation by member i does not provide direct information on si,
but provides information on k.
This is plausible, as i has participated in the pre-meeting and knows k.
Premise 2. The public tries to infer information on the degree of signal concur-
rence from the deviation and any actions that members take next. A higher degree
of inferred signal concurrence improves membersreputations.
Together both premises have the following implications. First, a deviation by mem-
ber i shows that a deal conicts with member is interests. Second, breaking a
united front hurts the reputation of everybody as it signals lack of concurrence.
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Third, from a deviation followed by (voting behaviour such that) X = 1 the public
infers a higher value of k than from a deviation followed by X = 0. The reason is
that the lower is the value of k, the smaller is the expected value of the project.
Below some critical value, the committee chooses to maintain the status quo. To
understand why this hurts reputation, observe that the lack of signal concurrence is
maximal if there are as many positive as negative signals, k = (n+ 1) =2. The less
evidence k there is, the more this situation is approached, and the worse it is for
reputation. Finally, the more members deviate from a united front, the lower the
reputation of every member, deviating or not, will be. The reason is that the more
members deviate, the larger is the highest degree i to which a deviating member
cares about his reputation, and thus the less positive evidence k must have been
presented in the pre-meeting.
5.1.1 Endorsement in the Voting Stage
To analyse endorsement in the voting stage, assume that endorsement of the deal
in the communication stage is unproblematic. In the absence of the possibility of
forming coalitions, the voting stage o¤ers little room for an individual member to
stop the project from being implemented. First, it requires unanimity, f = n.
Second, it hurts reputation. Let bi mgI ; vgIni denote the out-of-equilibrium belief
the public holds if it were to observe that member i breaks the united front in the
voting stage. The incentive to vote against implementation is felt most strongly in
case of k = k. The member most inclined to block implementation is member 1.
Proposition 3 Suppose coalitions cannot be formed. The deal will be endorsed in
the voting stage in the absence of unanimity voting. In case of unanimity, it will be
endorsed if
p+ E

jk+ 1b  mgI ; vgI ; k;  < 1bi mgI ; vgIni; vbi . (8)
5.1.2 Endorsement in the Communication Stage
The main advantage that deviating in the communication stage has over deviating in
the voting stage is that an individual deviation in the former stage can act as a lever
to induce widespread defection from the deal in the latter stage. This is particularly
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useful if a single member cannot veto project implementation and a coalition cannot
be formed. For the deal to be endorsed in the communication stage, then, either no
individual is willing to break the united front in that stage, or the leverage of his
deviant behaviour is too small. It is too small, if the decisive member d = n+1  f
continues voting favourably.12
To derive the condition that must hold for the deviation in the communication
stage to have too little leverage, assume that member 1 broke the united front in the
communication stage. This can be written as mgIn1. After this exchange, committee
members face a new situation. Independent of the decision that is taken next on
the project, the reputation of each member has been damaged relative to what it
would have been had the deal to support implementation been endorsed. This is
so, because ^
 
mgI ; v
g
I ;
k; 

is based on the possibility that signal concurrence was
high, with at least k  kFB equal, positive signals. After the deviation, the public
knows that such can no longer be the case. All but member 1 may want to keep up
appearances by voting favourably.
As was already derived from the two premises concerning out-of-equilibrium
beliefs, implementation commands a higher out-of-equilibrium reputation than the
status quo. Moreover, for a given decision X, reputation will not depend on the
actual distribution of votes. If it would, members could costlessly, i.e., without
a¤ecting the decision on the project, improve their reputations. The public would
see through this cheap talk behaviour. The out-of-equilibrium belief does depend on
the decision on the project, X. A change in decision a¤ects project payo¤s, a costly
signal. Therefore, ^

mgIn1; X = 1

> ^

mgIn1; X = 0

. Note that these beliefs are
independent of the identity of the member, as they are based on values of k.
We are now ready to state the conditions that should hold for the deal to be
endorsed. The defection from the united front by member 1 in the communication
stage remains unsuccessful if member d still prefers implementation over status quo.
But even if member d is willing to maintain the status quo if member 1 were to
deviate, it could be that member 1 nds it prohibitively costly to take this route to
oppose the deal.
12If he votes favourably, so do all members i > d who are more willing to give up project value
for a strengthened reputation. As a result, the project is implemented. If he votes against, so do
all members i < d who care less about their reputation, implying that the required majority is not
attained and the status quo is maintained.
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Proposition 4 Stopping a deal requires both that a member breaks the united front
in the deliberation stage, and that this deviation triggers the decisive member d to
support the status quo in the voting stage. Endorsement is guaranteed (i) if member
d continues to vote for implementation if member 1 were to break the united front
in the deliberation stage,
p+ E

jk+ d^ mgIn1; X = 1  d^ mgIn1; X = 0 , (9)
or (ii) if member 1 does not want to break the united front in the deliberation stage
although member d would then decide to maintain the status quo,
p+ E

jk+ 1^  mgI ; vgI ; k;   1^ mgIn1; X = 0 . (10)
5.2 A note on equilibria
We conclude this section with a note on equilibria. The situation we describe is
a voting game preceded by communication. Many uninteresting equilibria exist in
such games. For example, in our game it is an equilibrium for each member to
vote against implementation in the formal meeting irrespective of his signal. With
this kind of voting behaviour, no deal to support project implementation will be
endorsed. We ignore this kind of uninteresting equilibria. Moreover, the focus of
our analysis is on deals that unanimously support the decision on the project. Of
course, other forms of support can be imagined. A somewhat plausible one is that
when k < k
FB
the committee wants to convince the public that k only just fell short
of k
FB
(to keep the public from thinking disagreement was widespread). It could do
so by consciously presenting a small lack of disagreement by, say, stating mgI=1 and
voting vbI in the formal meeting. As there are no costs attached to such faking, it is
cheap talk. In equilibrium, the public sees through this behaviour.13
5.3 Coalition deviations possible
The voting stage o¤ers little room to block implementation if a member can only
consider a unilateral deviation. We now assume that members can nd out whether
13We have also ignored babbling equilibria and equilibria with a non-natural language.
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other members are disenchanted with the result of the pre-meeting. For example,
while leaving the pre-meeting, it may be quite clear who is happy with the deal and
who is not. This creates more room for successful deviations. If implementation
requires f favourable votes, a coalition C including the decisive member d = n+1 f
can successfully block it. There is however one major obstacle to forming such a
coalition, as plausible out-of-equilibrium beliefs are decreasing in the size of the
coalition breaking the united front. Therefore, if member 1 on his own is not willing
to break the united front, the formation of a coalition does not help. A larger
coalition can only help to overcome lack of numbers, but does so by compromising
every membersreputation. The project is endorsed if member d is unwilling to be
part of a coalition breaking the united front.
Proposition 5 Suppose that coalitions can be formed, and that the voting rule is
characterized by f . The deal will be endorsed in the voting stage if member d =
n+ 1  f is unwilling to be part of a coalition that breaks the united front,
p+ E

jk+ db  mgI ; vgI ; k;   dbd mgI ; vgInC , (11)
where C = f1; : : : ; dg.
5.4 When is the temptation to deviate strongest?
The fact that committee members must endorse a deal both in the communication
stage and voting stage of the formal meeting raises the question which of the two
stages sets the most restrictive limit to deals struck in the pre-meeting. We show that
the opportunity members have to state in public that a project is undesirable imposes
a more restrictive limit to deals than the opportunity to block an undesirable project
in the voting stage. This can be seen by comparing the inequalities in Propositions
4 and 5. Essential are the out-of-equilibrium posterior probabilities. As discussed
earlier, our assumptions on those probabilities are based on the idea that the public
tries to form a view on the degree of signal concurrence. The right-hand sides
of (9), (10) and (11) all pertain to situations where k is such that member d is
willing to block implementation. So it is natural to assume that ^

mgIn1; X = 0

=
^

mgI ; v
g
InC

. Under this assumption, (10) is more restrictive than (11) as 1 < d.
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Moreover, (9) is also more restrictive than (11). The reason is that when member
1 has deviated in the communication stage, the public knows that k < k
FB
. Hence,
even if the committee were next to implement the project, each members reputation
(including member ds) would be lower than in case the united front was upheld,
^

mgIn1; X = 1

< b  mgI ; vgI ; k; . As a result, once member 1 has deviated in the
communication, the drop in reputation for member d that stems from following 1s
lead rather than keeping up appearances is smaller. Member d therefore wants to
support member 1 who deviated in the communicated stage for a lower k than he
wants to participate in a coalition stopping implementation in the voting stage.
6 Is transparency to no avail?
We have argued that transparency may prompt committee members to organize pre-
meetings so as to pre-cook decisions. Does this mean that reforms that are intended
to foster transparency are to no avail? To answer this question we compare the
outcomes under a closed decision-making process (CDP) and the outcomes under a
transparentprocess with pre-meetings (TPM).
In a CDP, deliberation and voting take place behind closed doors. As a result, the
public observes the ultimate decision, but does not observe how it is reached. Visser
and Swank (2007) show that in such an environment, member d = n+1 f is decisive.
More specically, in case of a CDP the decision onX can be characterized by (6) and
(7), or (8), with j = d. This immediately brings us to the rst di¤erence between
the two types of decision-making processes. In a CDP, the maximum distortion
is known and depends on d. In a TPM, the distortion is less predictable. The
reason is that in the pre-meeting a formal voting rule does not exist. As a result,
the distortion may be smaller in case members i < d gain the upper hand; but it
could also be larger if some member i > d puts his mark on the deal. We regard
this unpredictability as a drawback of a TPM.
Let us now investigate whether distortions that are possible under CDP are also
possible under TPM. To this end, we assume that the decisive member of the for-
mal meeting, d, is also the member who dictates the deal in the pre-meeting. Will a
TPM perform as a CDP? That is, can the dictator have his way? In section 5.1, we
stressed that the endorsement condition reins in the extent to which deals can be
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distortive. From a social point of view, a TPM yields better outcomes than a CDP,
if distorted decisions implied by (8) are not endorsed in the formal meeting. This
requires at least that 1 is su¢ ciently small such that member 1 is willing to state
his opposition to project implementation in the communication stage. But it also
requires that next member d is willing to vote against implementation. This means
that (7) should hold, with j = d, as this characterizes the decision in the CDP. But
(10) should be violated, such that once member 1 has broken the united front, mem-
ber d no longer wants to support his own deal in the transparentpart of the TPM.
A su¢ cient condition is that ^
 
mbI ; v
b
I ;
kd; d

< ^

mgIn1; X = 0

.14 The public
deduces from the observation of mgIn1 that k 2
n
kd; : : : ; k
FB   1
o
, and from the
decision to maintain the status quo once the united has been broken that the actual
value of k is lower than some k^, with kd < k^  kFB 1. Although this hurts a mem-
bers reputation when compared with the reputation commanded by a united front
supporting implementation, it may still be better than the reputation commanded
by a united front supporting the status quo. This is the case if kd is relatively high
such that the public concludes from observing

mgIn1; X = 0

that the degree of
signal concurrence was relatively high.15 The above example illustrates that reforms
making decision-making processes more transparent may matter. Decision-making
under TPM is possibly less distortionary than decision-making under CDP.
7 Extensions
7.1 Participation in the pre-meeting
So far we have assumed that all members attend the pre-meeting. In this subsection
we argue that the incentive for an individual member to stay away from a pre-
meeting is weak. The primary reason why a member would want to skip a pre-
meeting is to reduce the likelihood that the decision on the project deviates from
14Note that the expression on the right hand side of (7) is larger than the expression on the right
hand side of (9) as ^
 
mgI ; v
g
I ;
kd; d

> ^d

mgIn1; X = 1

.
15An extreme example illustrates. Take n = 100, k
FB
= 100, and kd = 96. Observing
 
mbI ; v
b
I

implies k < 96. This gives very little information on membersabilities, and allows for very low
degrees of signal concurrence. But

mgIn1; X = 0

means that k equals at least 96, and therefore
virtually full signal concurrence.
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the one he deems best. The cost of staying away from a pre-meeting is a fall in
reputation because the united front is possibly broken. Therefore, the analysis of
the participation decision revolves around the trade-o¤ between a less distorted
implementation decision on the one hand, and a drop in reputation on the other.
Clearly, member 1 has the strongest incentive to stay away from the pre-meeting.
We therefore focus on him.
One important factor that reduces the attractiveness of skipping the pre-meeting
is its limited e¢ cacy. If member 1 decides to skip the pre-meeting he only knows his
own private view s1, but not k. Conict of interests about the deal need not have
occurred in the pre-meeting. For example, if k > k
FB
or k < k, no disagreement
arises. The benets of staying away are then zero, whereas the cost in terms of
a drop in reputation may be substantial. This lack of e¢ cacy is a drawback that
breaking the united front in the formal meeting does not have as the latter decision
can be conditioned on k.
Lack of e¢ cacy is not the only reason why membersincentives to skip a pre-
meeting are weak. By means of an example we show that member 1s absence may
aggravate distortions. Assume that if all members participate in the pre-meeting,
the deal is characterized by
 
k; 

. Suppose member 1 holds a negative view, sb1,
and deviates from the equilibrium by not attending the pre-meeting. Members who
do join deduce from his absence that member 1 holds a negative view. They can
therefore act in full knowledge of the total number of positive signals k. They also
anticipate that 1 will state mb1 in the formal meeting. Are they still indi¤erent be-
tween X = 1 and X = 0 for k = k? A deal to support the status quo continues to
yield ^
 
mbI ; v
b
I

, as the public still perceives a united front. A deal to support project
implementation now yields p + E

jk + ^i mgIn1; vgIn1. The out-of-equilibrium
belief of the public ^i

mgIn1; v
g
In1

is based on the assumption that 1 did not at-
tend the pre-meeting. This belief seems the most plausible one when focusing on a
members decision whether to skip the pre-meeting. The fact that member 1 is now
identied with a minority signal hurts his reputation considerably, and further re-
duces the attractiveness of staying away from the pre-meeting. It also implies that
the members who do attend the pre-meeting may command a higher reputation.
On the one hand, the public realises that mgIn1 implies k 6= n. This reduces their
reputation, and makes it less attractive to have a deal that favours implementation
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in case of k = k. On the other hand, as 1 is identied to be a member who held a
negative view, the likelihood that any of the members who joined the pre-meeting
held that minority view has gone down. This, in turn, strengthens their reputation
and makes them more inclined to distort the decision. If the latter e¤ect is stronger
than the former, staying away from the pre-meeting e¤ectively backres on member
1.16
7.2 Consequences of nal decision become observable
In this section we assume that the state of the environment becomes observable.
This information can help in assessing a members reputation. In the literature on
reputational concerns, this assumption is sometimes made, see e.g. Ottaviani and
Sørensen (2001) and Levy (2007). We show rst of all that the publics demand
for transparency can again be understood. Next, thanks to the observability of ,
the goal of a pre-meeting changes. With  observable, a members reputation is
strengthened if he correctly forecasts the state of the environment. A pre-meeting
helps in improving the quality of the forecast by basing it on additional information.
Finally, we emphasize that not all members may want to deviate from a transparent
meeting by gathering secretly before a formal meeting. As a result, real transparency
without a pre-meeting can be an equilibrium.
If a member shares his private information in a transparent meeting, his reputa-
tion depends exclusively on the quality of the match between his private statement
and the observed state of the economy. We write ^i (mi; ):17
^i (m
g
i ;  = h) = ^i
 
mbi ;  =  h

> ^i
 
mbi ;  = h

= ^i (m
g
i ;  =  h) = 0: (12)
16Such is the case for a committee with, e.g., n = 5, kFB = 5,
 
k; 

= (4; 0), and a value of  that
is not too high. If everybody joins the pre-meeting, mgI may mean k = 5, which commands a very
high reputation. For  not too high, it is however much more likely to mean k = 4. Conditional on
k = 4, the likelihood that, say, member 2 is the outlier (s2 = sb and s1 = s3 = s4 = s5 = sg) is 1=5.
Being an outlier hurts ones reputation considerably. Now suppose instead that 1 does not join
the pre-meeting, and that those who continue using
 
k; 

= (4; 0) to strike a deal. If the public
observes mgIn1, it then follows that k = 4 (rather than k 2 f4; 5g) and that 2 is not an outlier. As
a result, for not too high values of , the reputation of member 2 is higher in case 1 does not join
the pre-meeting than if he does.
17Note that Pr (mgi ;  = hjti = sm) = 1=2, Pr (mgi ;  = hjti = du) = 1=4, and
Pr (mgi ;  =  hjti = sm) = 0. Using Bayes rule, one obtains ^i (mgi ;  = h) = 2= (1 + )
and ^i (m
g
i ;  =  h) = 0.
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Because a member is competent with positive probability, it is more likely that
his private view corresponds with the state of nature than that it does not. This
implies that for a given view, and with beliefs as in (12), a member maximizes his
expected reputation by sharing his information. As the decision on the project does
not a¤ect a members reputation, there is no reason to distort that decision. Again,
the publics demand for transparency can be understood.
The anticipation of possible reputational damage may induce a member to collect
additional information before making a statement in public. Suppose members
deviate from the transparent meeting by gathering in advance, and sharing their
private views. If a majority of members holds positive views, k > (n+ 1) =2, a
positive state of the economy is more likely than a negative. As a result, for given
ex post beliefs (12) and speaking from a reputational perspective only, it is then in
every members interest to report mgi in the formal meeting. That is, the purpose
of a pre-meeting is not to feign concurrence, but for every individual member to
improve the accuracy of his own public statement.
In case the state of the environment remains unobserved, transparency is hard
to sustain as all members agree that a specic deviation is best: gather before the
formal meeting to exchange private views, decide what decision is rst-best given
that information, and collectively support that decision in the formal meeting. This
deviation yields the highest project payo¤ and the highest reputation for all. Mat-
ters are di¤erent in case the state is observed as conicts may arise concerning the
nal decision. To see this, suppose members deviate from the transparent meet-
ing by gathering in advance, and sharing their private views. For k  kFB, all
members agree that both from a reputational perspective and from a project value
perspective, supporting implementation is best. Similarly, if k < (n+ 1) =2, rep-
utational concerns and project value concerns are perfectly aligned: all members
favour the status quo. However, for k 2
n
(n+ 1) =2; : : : ; k
FB   1
o
, any member is
on the horns of a dilemma. From a reputational perspective each member wants
to favour implementation, but project value considerations dictate to maintain the
status quo. Members di¤er in the way they evaluate these costs and benets as they
attach di¤erent weights to their reputations. The anticipation that a deviation from
the transparent meeting may give rise to conicts among members concerning the
decision to support puts a brake on the formation of a pre-meeting.
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Now suppose a pre-meeting of all nmembers does take place. Given the just men-
tioned di¢ culties in forming a pre-meeting, conicts of interest in the pre-meeting
are likely to be smaller when  is observable than when  is unobservable. Never-
theless, conicts may arise for k 2
n
(n+ 1) =2; : : : ; k
FB   1
o
. From a reputational
perspective, every member should put his money where his mouth is, and favour
implementation both in the deliberation stage and in the voting stage. Doing other-
wise, i.e., verbally expressing support for implementation but voting against, shows
lack of conviction and costs reputation. Members who care little about their repu-
tation may accept this lower reputation if unwarranted implementation is too costly
and can be stopped in this way. The outcome of the pre-meeting is a deal. Any fea-
sible deal is characterized by a threshold value k^, with k^  (n+ 1) =2, such that for
k  k^, members state mgi and vote accordingly, vgi ; for k 2
n
(n+ 1) =2; : : : ; k^   1
o
,
members state mgi but vote v
b
i ; and for k < (n+ 1) =2, each member states m
b
i and
votes vbi .
18 Members 1 and d remain key in determining whether a feasible deal will
be endorsed. As before, the scope for an individual member to prevent a distorted
implementation decision in the voting stage is limited. A deviation in the delibera-
tion stage requires that member 1 cares little about his reputation, and that member
d is willing to support his deviation in the voting stage. Out-of-equilibrium beliefs
continue to play an important role.
7.3 Members know their abilities
So far, we have assumed that a committee member neither knows his own ability nor
the other membersabilities. When committees regularly gather, this assumption is
not plausible. It is then likely that at least some learning about abilities takes place.
In this section, we consider a committee in which every member knows his own
type and the other memberstypes. We maintain the assumption that the public
only knows the prior probability that a member is smart, . All this is common
knowledge. In particular, the public knows that among committee members ability
levels are known. To ensure that our model describes an interesting situation, we
assume that the view of a smart member may be awed, and the view of a dumb
18Feasible deals can also be characterized by a mixed strategy characterized by a pair

k^; 

.
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member may be correct,
1 > Pr ( = hjsg; sm) > Pr ( = hjsg; du) > 1=2 and
1 > Pr
 
 =  hjsb; sm > Pr   =  hjsb; du > 1=2.
The determination of the conditions under which implementation is rst-best is a
statistical matter that requires the appropriate weighing of members views, see
Nitzan and Paroush (1982). We assume again that  is not observed by the public,
and that p < 0 is such that, if all members are smart, implementation requires at
least (n+ 1) =2 positive signals.
If a member knows his ability, he may use the transparent meeting to posture to
make the public believe that he is more able than he knows he is. As a result, a trans-
parent meeting may give rise to a distorted decision. To see this, suppose members
share their views in the communication stage, and would stick to the rst-best rule.
As  is not observed, the public bases a members reputation on the degree of signal
concurrence and on the decision on the project, as the decision contains information
on the quality of the signals. For a given value of k, ^ (k;X = 1) > ^ (k;X = 0),
as on average a higher number of members is smart in case of implementation. By
choosing X = 1 rather than X = 0; committee members may pretend that a high
number of members is smart. However, deviating from the socially optimal decision
requires cooperation among members or requires some norm regarding the specic
conditions under which the project should be implemented. As a result, several
equilibria exist. In some of them, members distort the implementation decision to
feign that many members are smart. Hence, the assumption on whether or not
members know their own and each othersabilities may a¤ect membersincentives
to distort the implementation decision under transparency. Membersincentives to
posture may lead to incentives to distort the implementation decision.
The incentive to organize a pre-meeting does not change. As before, disagreement
among committee members damages their reputations. By organizing a pre-meeting
committee members can conceal disagreement. Moreover, reputational concerns may
prompt committee members to make socially undesirable deals in a pre-meeting,
and the formal meeting may put a limit to the extent to which such deals are
distortionary.
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8 Conclusion
If decisions are made behind closed doors, those who have delegated decision power
may suspect that the decisions made are not in their interest. Why else the secrecy?
Requiring transparency is then a logical reaction. Some case studies suggest that
committees shy away from deliberating in transparent meetings. The real delibera-
tion seems to move to a pre-meeting, where a deal is reached as to the decision to be
unanimously supported in the formal meeting. In this paper, we have presented a
theory that explains the publics demand for transparency; the committee members
aversion to it; and the emergence of a pre-meeting. Rather than imposing structure
on the decision process in the pre-meeting, we have focused on deals that survive
(are endorsed in) the formal meeting. Our analysis suggests that pre-meetings may
partially nullify the benets of transparency. However, the fact that members can
choose to break the united front in the formal meeting or decide not to take part in
the pre-meeting puts limits on distortionary deals.
As far as we know, our paper presents the rst formal analysis of the emergence
and consequences of pre-meetings. We are aware that our analysis should be re-
garded as a rst step to a richer model. We have not addressed several issues that
seem to be relevant for understanding the role of pre-meetings in decision-making
processes. Let us briey discuss three of them. First, in our model committee
members di¤er in one dimension, namely in the extent to which they are concerned
about their reputations. In many applications, committee members also di¤er in
their preferences concerning the desirability of the project. Of course, introducing
this aspect into our model would a¤ect members incentives to support a deal in
the formal meeting. Second, we have assumed in this paper that in the pre-meeting
committee members share information. One motivation for this assumption is that
committee members are often experts in their elds. In several situations, experts
may fool the public, faking a united front, but are not capable of fooling each other.
However, in other situations experts may also trick each other. The analysis of
committee members incentives to share information in the pre-meeting is thus a
promising next step. Third, we have limited the analysis to pre-meetings in which
all members participate. By assumption, we have ruled out the possibility of the
emergence of several pre-meetings. We conjecture that the emergence of several
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pre-meetings is especially likely when information in pre-meetings can be manipu-
lated. The formation of homogenous groups may facilitate communication among
members.
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